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Abstract 
This paper uses new product-specific, micro-level US data to show that New England 
had lower levels of productivity in cotton spinning than Lancashire, c. 1900, 
contradicting results derived by Broadberry from the Censuses of Production. The 
discrepancy stems from the Censuses’ poor methods of aggregating heterogeneous 
yarn output. The finding that Britain – the labour-abundant country – has higher 
labour productivity contradicts the Rothbarth-Habakkuk model. We suggest Britain’s 
industrial success stems from more intensive competition, manifested through 
external economies of scale and longer production runs. We finish with some 
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I 
As befits the leading industry of its day, the Lancashire cotton industry has been 
studied extensively, both by contemporaries and by economic and social historians. 
The resulting literature is prodigious, with a recent select bibliography running to 
3000 items
2. All periods are well studied, with different questions dominant for 
economic and social historians of different periods. For the period c. 1900, the key 
questions revolve around the causes and consequences of Lancashire’s differences. 
Lancashire was the industry most attached to the spinning mule and the power loom, 
and least enthusiastic about the ring and automatic loom. It was the industry that grew 
by adding more and more firms, with little or no growth in firm size. The Lancashire 
cotton industry also remained vertically specialised almost beyond imagination. It is 
most often compared with its opposite number in New England, where firms were 
more likely to adopt the new (American-invented) technologies of the ring and 
automatic loom, to be large, and to be vertically integrated. Good summaries of the 
general literature can be found in Marrison, Mass and Lazonick, and Rose.
3
Much work has been done both to explain Lancashire’s technological choices, and to 
document the possible advantages of moving over to a system more similar to that 
prevalent in New England. Yet despite this volume of work, there is little that 
explicitly investigates which country had higher productivity in producing cotton 
goods. This is surprising, since detailed and reliable productivity estimates can be 
used to assess more accurately the effects of a number of aspects of cotton spinning 
that differed in the two countries. For example, following Marshall it is frequently 
claimed that the Lancashire cotton industry benefited from external economies of 
scale.
4 In addition, Lancashire workers, especially mule spinners, were renowned for 
high levels of skill and experience, which might reasonably be expected to lead to 
higher productivity.
5 Finally, the industry was highly competitive, in that it was 
characterised by many firms and extreme vertical specialisation. Modern empirical 
work increasingly finds that competition is an effective incentive mechanism for 
managers.
6 In contrast, others have claimed that larger US firms gained from internal 
economies of scale, and that vertical integration allowed the co-ordinated introduction 
of newer generations of machinery in both spinning and weaving.
7 Both the ring and 
the automatic loom offered considerably higher levels of capital productivity than the 
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older technologies of mule and power loom. Further, compared with Britain, capital 
and especially labour in New England were relatively expensive compared with the 
cost of raw cotton and fuel, so we would expect manufacturers to economise on those 
factors, in line with the Rothbarth-Habakkuk hypothesis.
8 This again points to high 
levels of labour productivity in New England. We will use detailed estimates of 
productivity within the industry to assess the historical importance of these factors.  
This paper begins by looking first at the Rothbarth-Habakkuk and Chandlerian 
frameworks, before contrasting the position of the two industries c. 1900. We then 
review the small secondary literature on Anglo-American productivity in cotton 
spinning, arguing that although Broadberry’s work is clearly the best available, it is 
not, inherently, the best method available to assess productivity in this industry, and 
that the results are correspondingly hard to interpret. In section three we compile and 
compare four sets of micro-level productivity estimates, covering Lancashire rings, 
Lancashire mules, New England rings and New England mules. Section four sets out 
the implication of these results for work on productivity and analyses the likely causes 
of Britain’s generally impressive performance. Section five then extends that analysis 
to offer a few more speculative comments on Britain’s success in the first and second 
industrial revolutions, and section six concludes. 
II 
Any work setting out to compare Anglo-American productivity in the nineteenth 
century must begin with the Rothbarth-Habakkuk thesis.
9 At its simplest, it states that 
in land-rich America, labour was drawn to agriculture, so that industry became 
characterised by high capital intensity and by correspondingly high labour 
productivity. In contrast, land-poor Britain had abundant industrial labour, so industry 
was characterised by low capital intensity and low labour productivity.
10 This 
hypothesis has seen both theoretical and empirical challenges. Temin showed that the 
theoretical factor complementary assumptions underpinning the model are 
unrealistically restrictive,
11 while Field has shown that, empirically, the United States 
was not more capital intensive than Great Britain.
12 Despite these criticisms, the idea 
that the US was a labour-scarce economy can be reclaimed. First, as Field himself 
points out, if we define capital as machinery, so excluding buildings – of which the 
British stock far outweighed the American in the nineteenth century – it becomes 
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possible to view the US as the more capital-intensive, labour-scarce economy.
13 
Second, agricultural products that were used as inputs in manufacturing were 
relatively abundant vis-à-vis labour in the US. This encouraged US manufacturers to 
engage in labour-saving, resource-intensive methods of production that raised labour 
productivity.
14 For cotton processing this implies using ring spindles and automatic 
looms, machinery that saved on labour, especially skilled labour, but demanded better 
quality raw cotton. In the Rothbarth-Habakkuk model, different levels of labour 
productivity are the rational outcomes of economic actors responding to different 
historical circumstances.  
Opposed to this strand of literature is one associated with Chandler in general, and 
particularly with Lazonick for the cotton industry. In this view, American 
manufacturing supremacy is primarily the result of innovation and investment in 
management, production and marketing. Mass marketing created standard demands 
that could be satisfied by mass produced goods. That in turn demanded good 
management organisation to create high-throughput production techniques and to 
ensure high levels of capital utilisation. This story is in some sense a-historical and a-
national, in that the opportunity to make the three-pronged investment is seen as 
universal. The American experience, then, is one that others could have followed, and 
against which they may legitimately be judged.  
We now turn to look at the two industries, which have strong similarities at the most 
aggregate level: notwithstanding cyclical fluctuations, both grew throughout the 
nineteenth century and until the outbreak of war in 1914. In both cases, the rates of 
growth slowed as the period went on, so that the period after, say, 1875 can be 
characterised as one of maturity. But the two industries did differ in three ways: 
market orientation, product mix, and industrial organisation, 
At its simplest, Britain produced for export, whereas the US produced for domestic 
consumption. Exports accounted for 80% of British cotton output between 1880 and 
1910, and Britain accounted for around three-quarters of world cotton exports.
15 
Approximately one-half of British cloth exports, by volume, went to India, a quarter 
to other low-income areas, and one percent to the United States.
16 The US industry, in 
contrast, produced primarily for domestic consumers: the US Census described the 
export trade ‘as an accident rather than as an industry’.
17 Expansion was driven 
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instead by the growing size of the US domestic market, in this, the era of peak 
immigration.
18 Exports, such as they were, came primarily from Southern rather than 
New England firms, with China the most important destination.
19
The US imposed tariffs on imported cotton goods, with a nominal tariff of 37%. As 
ever, the nominal rate understated the effective rate of tariff protection, defined as the 
extent to which domestic producers could raise costs above those needed to survive 
under free trade. Hawke estimates that the effective protection rate for US cotton in 
1904 was 238%, a prohibitive level, sufficient to keep imports of British cotton to 
trivially low levels.
20 It is worth noting that the New England cotton industry, on 
which this paper focuses, had no tariff protection against competition from mills in 
the US South –state level protectionism is precluded by the US Constitution.
21 The 
South emerged as an important cotton processing area in the postbellum era. In 1880 
it had only one-twentieth as many spindles as the North, but just ten years later it 
produced as much coarse (“sub-20 count”) cotton as the north.
22  The rise of the 
South, and its emphasis on long runs of standardised coarse goods, prompted a shift in 
New England production, with output of coarse yarn falling first as a proportion of 
output, and then from 1900 in absolute terms.
23 This shift by New England firms 
towards higher count yarn meant that New England mills – designed on Chandlerian 
lines to produce high quantities of standardised (coarse) goods – were forced to 
produce a wide variety of finer goods.
24 In his history of the Lowell’s Boott Mills, 
Gross outlines how this attempt to avoid Southern competition proved difficult. 
Whereas in the 1880s sheetings and shirtings alone accounted for three-quarters of 
output, by 1902 the mill was producing 276 different types of cloth, using over 100 
different yarns.
25 Gross finds that the use of a “Chandlerian” mill to produce short 
runs of many different products increased ‘the difficulties of production manyfold’.
26  
Although New England mills were moving away from coarse goods, New England 
goods were, on average, still considerable coarser than those produced in Britain. The 
1905 Census records that 37% of New England yarn output by weight was made up of 
sub-20 count yarn, with just 15% finer than count 40.
27 The equivalent figures for 
Britain, based on the machinery data assembled by Saxonhouse and Wright, are 19% 
and 35% respectively.
28 In simple terms, New England was twice as likely to be 
producing coarse yarn as Lancashire, and less than half as likely to be producing fine 
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yarn. Despite these differences, both industries produced sizeable quantities of all 
types of yarn.  
The two industries were organised differently: integrated spinning-weaving firms 
accounted for 87% of New England’s spindles but only 21% of Lancashire’s.
29 The 
effects of Lancashire’s preference for vertical specialisation have been much 
investigated,
30 but here we note only that vertical specialisation increased the 
elasticity of demand for yarn. A specialised spinner lowering costs had three ways to 
increase sales: increasing the amount sold to weavers whom it already supplied, 
increasing the number of weavers to whom it sold, and by exporting (additional) yarn 
to foreign weavers. In contrast spinning departments in New England’s integrated 
firms could not increase sales to their own weaving departments, whose demands 
were fixed by their number of looms, or make sales to other integrated firms, who 
purchased yarn from their own spinning sections, or by exporting yarn. As a result 
vertical integration lowered New England firms’ incentives to engage in cost lowering 
innovations.  
It is often perceived that British firms were smaller than those in New England. For 
spinners this was true only in the sense that New England firms were vertically 
integrated. New England firms did not contain more spindles than British firms: the 
average sizes were 55,000 and 68,000 spindles per firm respectively.
31 There was 
considerable variation in firm size in both places. The largest US firm, the Amoskeag, 
had 650,000 spindles, but was highly atypical: only two other New England firms had 
more than 200,000 spindles.
32 The largest British spinning company, Musgrove 
Spinning, had 460,000 spindles, but it too was atypical.
33 It is worth noting that very 
large mills were really combinations of several mills, each run, to all intents and 
purposes, as separate businesses.
34
Only three authors, Lazonick, Clark and Broadberry, have calculated the level of 
labour productivity in the British and American cotton industry in the pre-war period. 
Their aims and methodologies are profoundly different, but none give entirely 
satisfactory results.  
As part of his work on comparative industrial relations systems, Lazonick looks at 
mule spinners producing count 32 yarn.
35 He notes that British mill owners bought 
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shorter staple raw cotton than their American counterparts. According to Lazonick, 
the use of inferior cotton reduced cotton costs, but lowered capital and labour 
productivity. After noting the difficulties in estimating comparative labour 
productivity, Lazonick writes that ‘in the late 1890s output per “direct” worker-hour 
(that is, including auxiliary labor) in spinning no. 32s was at least 15-20 percent 
higher in Fall River than in Oldham.’ He also argues that corrected for the higher 
proportion of skilled, experienced operatives in Lancashire, ‘labor productivity in 
spinning 32s around the turn of the century was about 40 percent higher in Fall River 
than Oldham.’
36  
Lazonick gives no details as to how he derives his estimates, and his evidence is 
weak. He cites Taggart and Cramer’s contemporary books on cotton mill management 
as sources for Oldham and for Fall River respectively, but neither gives data on output 
per worker, only on output per spindle. In addition, Cramer writes explicitly that his 
book is ‘published for the Southern trade’ rather than for New England.
37 Finally, 
Cramer’s figure for output per spindle is only 6 percent higher than Taggart’s for 
Lancashire.
38 In short, it is hard to take as reliable Lazonick’s claim that Fall River 
mule spinners were either 15-20 percent or 40 percent more productive than their 
Lancashire rivals. 
As part of his attempt to explain why the whole world is not developed, Clark 
assembles evidence on spinning productivity in cotton in Britain and the US.
39 He 
first assesses capital-labour ratios (which he calls ‘labour efficiency’), before looking 
at capital-output ratios. He finds that US ring spinners tended 44% more spindles, but 
that British ring spindles were 8% more productive, from which we can deduce that 
the US had a labour productivity lead of 33% in ring spinning.
40 He does not produce 
explicit figures for mule spinning. We would not, however, want to put too much 
weight on this result. Clark’s aim was to provide numbers with which to contrast 
manning levels in high and low wage countries, rather than to allow an Anglo-
American productivity comparison; indeed it is noteworthy that he does not give an 
Anglo-American productivity figure. Instead he notes that his labour efficiency 
measure ‘is contaminated by a number of differences between countries’, namely 
‘differences in machinery types, different proportions of women and children and 
different types of yarn and cloth produced’.
41  
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Broadberry’s motives for measuring productivity in cotton spinning are different. 
Whereas Lazonick was motivated by specific questions about cotton, and Clark by 
questions of global magnitude, Broadberry is interested in the economy-wide 
productivity outcome of the interaction of Britain’s and America’s willingness to 
accept product standardisation on the demand side with differing levels of skills on 
the supply side.
42 Via the two alternatives of mass production and flexible production, 
these have implications for productivity in both the short and the long run. Broadberry 
uses Production Censuses in the two countries to assess productivity in each cotton 
industry as a whole, and, in an appendix, sub-divides the results into the spinning and 
weaving sections, with separate productivity results for each.
43 He also covers 28 
other industries to give a comprehensive economy wide picture. His methodology is 
straightforward and generally robust. He takes data on the physical quantity of output 
and the number of workers directly from the Censuses for each country, and divides 
output by employment. For cotton, as for most other goods, output is measured by 
weight. For this period Broadberry uses the 1907 British Census and the 1909 US 
Census, and finds that productivity in the spinning section was 20 percent higher in 
the US than in Britain.
44 He notes that, overall, US productivity rose 3.3 percent 
between 1907 and 1909, which implies a best guess estimate of a 17 percent US 
productivity lead for cotton spinning in 1907.
45 Although the US is the leader in 
cotton spinning, its advantage in that sector is less than that in manufacturing as a 
whole, prompting Broadberry to conclude that ‘Britain clearly did well in textiles’.
46  
The level of aggregation makes Broadberry’s result hard to interpret. We have already 
noted that the product mix was very different in the two countries. Since heavier, 
coarse goods made up a higher proportion of US output, the use of weight as a 
measure biases the results in favour of the US. This makes Broadberry’s result 
compatible with three scenerios, each with different implications for industrial 
leadership. First, the US may have led in the production of a given yarn using a given 
machinery type. Such a result would demonstrate the clear superiority of American 
manufacturers, in that they were able to produce more from any given piece of 
machinery. As an alternative, it may be that Lancashire’s external economies of scale 
outweighed the internal economies available to US firms, so that Lancashire’s 
productivity when using any given machine exceeded that of the US, but that the 
different mix of rings and mules in each country gave the US an overall lead in the 
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production of any given yarn. We would still conclude that America’s manufacturers 
were superior, but the story would not so much be one of greater managerial success, 
but instead a manifestation of the Rothbarth-Habakkuk thesis, with different factor 
prices leading firms in different countries to adopt different technologies, with 
different but inevitable productivity outcomes. A third option would be for Lancashire 
to lead in the production of any given yarn, including the different mix of rings and 
mules, but with this lead hidden by the greater preponderance of coarse yarn in US 
output. In this case it would be right to characterise the British as leaders in cotton 
spinning, because they were the more efficient producers of any given product. This 
leadership would be masked by different output mixes, caused by different demand 
structures. The aggregate nature of Broadberry’s result does not allow us to say which 
of these three stories is correct, and it is for this reason that we characterise 
Broadberry’s results as hard to interpret. 
III  
In theory, labour productivity is easy to calculate: total output is simply divided by 
total employment. In reality the process is not as straightforward because countries 
often produce different products, with different labour and capital requirements. 
Production Censuses are often used as a source of information on output. Censuses, 
however, operate at high and often crude levels of aggregation. For cotton, data 
availability leads both the UK and US Censuses to aggregate output by weight, even 
though, as the US Census itself acknowledges, ‘the efficiency of spindles is measured 
by the length rather than the weight of their product’.
47 In the case of cotton spinning, 
however, we can do better than this, by avoiding the aggregation problem altogether. 
Micro-level output estimates for different types of yarn are readily available, allowing 
us to construct individual productivity estimates for each type (count) of yarn, from 
coarse to fine. This cannot be done for weaving, as cloth is more heterogeneous and 
harder to describe than yarn. It is worth noting in passing, however, that linear length, 
the measure of output used by the Census for cloth is, like weight, biased in favour of 
coarse cloth producers such as the United States. Each time the weaving shuttle 
inserts the weft yarn into the warp it creates a length of cloth equal to the diameter of 
the weft inserted, so a weaver using coarse yarn creates more length with each shuttle 
pass. Unfortunately it would require much more evidence than is available to quantify 
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the magnitude of this bias with any degree of reliability, and, as a result, we limit our 
attention to cotton spinning. 
The division of cotton yarn into coarse and fine yarns was not a division into mass-
produced and craft-produced yarns. All cotton yarns, even the finest counts, were 
mass-produced. Some consumers preferred coarse yarn to fine, even at the same price, 
because coarse yarns were better for some uses, such as sacking. To economists, 
different counts of yarn are examples of horizontal differentiation, that is, goods 
where consumers’ choices depend on the use they wish to make of the product, rather 
than on their income.
48
As well as disaggregating yarn output to the level of individual counts, we also 
construct separate productivity estimates for ring and mule spinners in each country. 
This in turn will allow us to separate out the three influences on productivity which 
we identified earlier: different ratios of coarse to fine yarns, different ratios of ring to 
mule use and different factor cost conditions under which firms operated. The last 
includes the degree of competitive pressure and the availability of internal and 
external economies of scale. 
We now construct four separate labour productivity series, for Lancashire rings, 
Lancashire mules, New England rings and New England mules. We choose to restrict 
our analysis to New England rather than to the US as a whole because writers seeking 
to understand the cotton industry most often compare Lancashire with New England. 
These were the sectors that had led the move to industrialisation, and by 1900 both 
these sectors had long histories of spinning, and both faced the same challenges of 
new technologies. In all cases our figures will apply to the period c. 1907, although 
inevitably there is some variation around that date. Each series will give productivity 
per week for as wide a range of counts as the data allow. The denominator will be 
workers directly involved in the spinning process itself, that is, spinners, piecers and 
doffers, but excluding supervisors, auxiliary staff such as cleaners, and workers in 
preparatory processes, such as carders.  
Although explicit data on labour productivity are not common, evidence on both 
output per spindle and spindles per worker is common, so that we can easily construct 
  11 of 39  
data for output per worker, using the identity that states that labour productivity is the 
product of capital productivity and the capital to labour ratio. Algebraically,  
(Q/L) = (Q/K).(K/L) 
where Q is the amount produced, L the amount of labour and K the amount of capital, 
in this case measured by the number of spindles. As mentioned, estimates both of 
output per spindle and of spindles per worker are readily available; we begin with 
output per spindle, first in Lancashire, then in New England, before looking at 
spindles per worker. 
We use Taggart’s comprehensive 1923 series for output per mule and ring spindle in 
Lancashire. These series are compatible both with Winterbottom’s 1907 series 
(average deviations of 0.1% and 1.3% for mules and for rings respectively) and with 
data on British mule productivity in the 1912 US Tariff Board Report (average 
deviations of 1%).
49 We favour Taggart’s series because they are the most 
comprehensive. Taggart’s series are not actual production data, but rather an estimate 
of ‘good average production’
50 for a book described as a ‘practical and orthodox 
statement of present mill working.’
51 The same is true for Winterbottom’s series. Both 
books were written for cotton managers and overlookers, and there seems no reason to 
think that these series are biased in either direction. In addition, as mentioned, the 
series are exceptionally close to the actual productivity figures presented by the Tariff 
Board Report. We therefore feel confident in using them as a measure of actual output 
per spindle. 
There is no equivalent source to Taggart for New England.
52 Instead we use new 
archival evidence drawn from the surviving production records of three large New 
England firms: the Amoskeag, the Lyman and the Naumkeag. These records, kept in 
the Historical Collections section of Harvard Business School’s Baker Library, give 
the actual output per spindle at a range of counts. We have 43 observations for mule 
spinning and 24 for ring spinning. We use regression analysis to estimate a single 
continuous series for New England mules and a corresponding series for New 
England rings. Both the data and the procedure are given in appendix one. 
There is obviously a concern as to whether these three firms were representative of 
New England. Both industry-wide and other firm-level observations suggest that they 
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were. At the industry-wide level the 1909 US Census reported New England yarn 
output for three count categories, sub-20, 21-40 and supra-40.
53 Dividing these total 
output figures by our estimates of output per spindle gives an estimate of the number 
of spindles in place. This estimate is just 1% different to the actual number of spindles 
given in the Census, telling us that our sample of firms closely mirrored average 
productivity in New England. The full details are again given in appendix one. 
Our estimates are also in line with observations from two other independent sources. 
The 1912 Tariff Board Report recorded output of 1.12 pounds (count 32 warp) and 
0.616 pounds (count 50 weft) per ring per 56 hour week for a new US mill.
54 Our 
estimates are 1.07 and 0.55 pounds respectively: an 8% difference between new and 
average machinery seems reasonable. Young recorded that a Lowell mill produced 
1.35 pounds (count 28 warp) per ring per 58 hour week; our estimate is 1.34 pounds 
for a week of that length.
55  
Figure one gives output per ring and per mule spindle in each industry. It shows that, 
as we would expect, ring spindles had higher levels of capital productivity than mule 
spindles, especially at lower counts. It also shows that, when using a particular 
machine to spin a particular count, Lancashire generally had higher rates of capital 
productivity than did New England. This is true for rings at all counts, and for mules 
at all counts up to and including count 60. That British rings were more productive 
than US ones is less controversial than it may at first sight appear; the same result was 
found by the 1912 Tariff Board Report, which looked at output in new mills, and by 
Clark.
56  
Figure 1 [Output per spindle (pounds weight per 100 spindles per 55.5 hour week)] 
about here 
We now move on to the less straightforward process of assessing the capital to labour 
ratio for each type of machine in each country. As mentioned, we look at those 
directly involved in the spinning process and do not include auxiliary labour such as 
supervisors or cleaners, nor those involved in the earlier preparatory stages, such as 
carding. In both countries ring spinners worked alone rather than in teams, but had 
doffers to remove the completed bobbins. In contrast mule spinners were responsible 
for their own doffing, but were assisted by piecers – two per spinner in Lancashire 
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and one per spinner in New England.
57 In order to ensure that the comparison is fair, 
we include ring doffers and mule piecers, as well as the spinners themselves. 
The 1905 US Census stated that each New England mule spinner tended 1124 
spindles. All were recorded as aged over sixteen, indicating that piecers were not 
included. Since each New England mule spinner had one piecer to assist them, each 
mule spinning operative was responsible for 562 spindles. The UK Census did not 
publish equivalent data for British mule spinners, but decadal data on spindles per 
new mule in Oldham and Bolton is given in Jewkes and Gray. Mules lasted around 
fifty years, which combined with growth rates in the industry, implies that the average 
mule in 1907 was installed c. 1886.
58 In that year new mules averaged 1044 and 986 
spindles in Oldham and Bolton respectively, giving an average of 1032 spindles for 
Lancashire.
59 A three-person mule team, responsible for a pair of mules, would have 
tended 2064 spindles per team, that is 688 spindles per operative, a figure 22 percent 
higher than in New England. This lead fits in well with the qualitative literature, 
which stressed the level of skill of Lancashire’s mule spinners.
60
The 1905 US Census states that New England ring spinners tended 522 spindles 
each.
61 The relatively high proportion of males recorded tells us that the Census 
includes doffers in this definition of spinners, explaining the low capital to labour 
ratio compared with the figures given by, say, Copeland.
62 Again, the UK Census 
does not provide equivalent information for Lancashire. We do, however, know both 
average earnings and the wage rate per spindle, so we divide the former by the latter 
to find the number of spindles per ring spinner.
63 We also know that there were on 
average 61 doffers per 100 spinners, allowing us to express our capital-labour ratio 
estimates on a per operative basis.
64 The results for Lancashire ring spinners are given 
in table one. As can be seen, the capital-labour ratio rose with the count, because 
‘there is less work involved in tending 100 spindles producing fine yarn than the same 
number of spindles producing coarse yarn.’
65 No evidence exists on whether fine yarn 
spinners tended more spindles in New England as in Lancashire. Because of this lack 
of evidence we consider two cases, the first assuming that all New England spinners 
tended 522 spindles, irrespective of count, the second assuming that the capital-labour 
ratio rose with the count, as in Lancashire. In the former case New England operatives 
tended between twenty and one hundred per cent more spindles per operative, 
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depending on the count, in the latter a consistent thirty one per cent more spindles 
than did Lancashire ring spinners.
66 Again this is plausible: Clark finds that US ring 
spinners tended forty four percent more spindles than their Lancashire counterparts.
67  
TABLE 1 [Ring spindles per operative, Lancashire] about here 
Now that we have data on output per spindle and spindles per worker, it is a matter of 
simple multiplication to calculate output per worker. The results are given in Figure 
two. We can see that Lancashire mule spinners had consistently higher productivity 
than Lancashire ring spinners, whereas in New England the reverse was true for all 
counts up to 60. This is in keeping with contemporaries’ observations: Copeland, for 
example, noted that English mule spinners high rates of productivity meant that ‘their 
high earnings do not constitute a comparatively heavy burden upon the English 
employers’. He attributed this to their adeptness, and stated that mule spinners from 
elsewhere would not be able to command their earnings, even were they to move to 
Lancashire. It is worth noting that had Britain’s transition to ring spinning been faster, 
aggregate productivity would have fallen. In some sense this should not surprise us: 
mule spinners were better paid than ring spinners, investments in mule spinning 
continued to be profitable in this era, so the implication has to be that mule spinners 
were more productive than ring spinners.
68  
Figure two also shows that Lancashire mule operatives were unambiguously more 
productive than any other group. It also shows that at low counts New England ring 
spinners were more productive than Lancashire ring spinners, with the positions 
reversed at higher counts. This result is driven entirely by the assumption that the 
number of spindles per New England worker did not vary with the count spun. Were 
it to have done so, then ring spinners in the two countries would have had almost 
identical productivity for all counts before the mid-50s, with Lancashire opening up a 
lead at higher counts.  
Figure 2 [Output per operative (pounds weight per 55.5 hour week)] about here  
Three pieces of independent evidence support the estimates given in figure two. First, 
we can calculate unit labour costs for each method of production from these 
productivity figures and data on workers’ wages. The details are given in appendix 
two. As expected, the labour cost advantage of using rings is lower in Lancashire than 
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in New England. Taking into account the extra cost of the longer staple raw cotton 
required for ring spinning, we find that the costs of rings and mules were finely 
balanced in Lancashire for all counts less than 40 with mules dominant thereafter, but 
that rings dominated for all except higher counts (at least 60) in New England. This is 
in line with observed investment behaviour.  
Second, data drawn from the 1912 US Tariff Board Report on Cotton Manufactures, 
presented in table two, supports the notion that Lancashire mule spinners were more 
productive than New England ring spinners.
 The Tariff Board found that the average 
labour cost of producing a given type of yarn was thirty per cent lower when using 
mules in the UK than when using rings in the US, implying that UK wages were thirty 
percent lower, that US workers were thirty percent less productive, or some 
combination of the two.
69 US textile workers (excluding salaried officials) were paid 
an average of $304 p.a. in 1905, and British cotton workers £48 ($233.60) p.a. in 
1906, implying that British firms had ten percent higher productivity than that of their 
US rivals.
70 The Tariff Board itself concluded that ‘the output per spinner per hour in 
England is probably as great or greater than in this country’.
71 The data in the Tariff 
Board cannot be compared directly with the data given here, since the former covers 
all of the US, rather than just New England, and includes all processes from the raw 
cotton arriving in the factory to being spun, but it does show that contemporaries were 
aware that Lancashire’s mule spinners were highly productive.  
Table 2 [Estimates of Labour Productivity using Tariff Board Report data] about here. 
Third, firm-level evidence survives in the form of the Lyman mills mule spinners’ 
wage list. This gave the wage per 100 pounds of yarn produced. Multiplying these 
wages by the productivity levels in figure two, and remembering that mule spinners 
were paid for gross output, that is, including the output of their piecer, gives an 
estimate of earnings of between $9.56 and $12.48, depending on the count spun. We 
know in fact that Lyman mule spinners earnings averaged $10.18 in 1909 and $11.99 
in 1913, both within the range given by our productivity estimates.
72
Having established the productivity per worker on each machine, we now move on to 
look at which industry had the lead in producing any given type of cotton, using the 
production techniques typical in that country. By this we do not simply mean whether 
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Lancashire mule spinners were more productive than New England ring spinners –
figure two shows that this was the case – but rather whether producing, say, 100 
pounds of count 32 yarn took fewer worker-hours in one country than the other, using 
the representative mix of workers and machinery producing that yarn in each place. 
We know from the Census that, overall, sixteen percent of Lancashire’s spindles were 
rings and 84 percent were mules.
73 Saxonhouse and Wright give the distribution of 
each by count, from which we can calculate the proportion of each count of yarn 
produced on rings and mules.
74 Since we are interested in labour productivity, we 
convert the proportion of yarn produced on rings and mules into the proportion of 
yarn produced by ring operatives and mule operatives, using the capital-labour ratios 
assembled earlier. We do the same for New England, using the Census for the overall 
ratio of rings to mules, and the Amoskeag, Lyman and Naumkeag mills data in 
appendix one to find the distribution of each type of spindles by count.
75 The 
distribution of both spindles and operatives is given in table three. It is worth noting 
that mule spinning’s higher capital to labour ratio, especially in Britain, mean that that 
percentage of mule operatives is lower than the percentage of mule spindles at any 
count.  
Table 3 ‘Percentage of spindles and operatives by count’ about here 
Combining the data in table three with that in figure two allows us to construct overall 
figures for output per operative. Figure three gives New England data both on the 
assumption that all ring operatives had equal numbers of spindles, and in addition, 
where the result is materially different, on the assumption that the capital to labour 
ratio for New England ring operatives varied with the count. Figure three shows that 
average labour productivity was higher in Lancashire for all counts of 20 and over, 
with a sizeable lead for counts of 30 and over. This is true whether or not the New 
England ring capital-labour ratio varied by count. For coarser yarns that assumption 
proves to be crucial: if the capital-labour ratio was constant, then New England has a 
labour productivity lead of seven percent at count 16, if the ratio did vary, then 
Lancashire has a lead of nine percent. The most sensible conclusion that can be drawn 
is that the two industries were broadly equal for coarse yarn, that Lancashire had a 
slight productivity lead for counts in the 20s, and a clear lead for yarns finer than 30. 
Figure 3 [Output per operative (pounds weight per 55.5 hour week)] about here 
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IV 
These results show that aggregation techniques used in the Census can make it an 
unreliable source for productivity estimates. Based on Production Censuses, 
Broadberry found that United States labour productivity in cotton spinning was 17 
percent higher than in Britain. Since this paper looks only at New England – where 
capital-labour ratios were sixty percent higher than in the United States as a whole – 
we would expect to find that New England’s labour productivity was much higher 
than in Britain. Instead we found that the two industries had similar productivity for 
low count yarn, and that New England had lower productivity for all counts above 20. 
The problem is that the Census aggregated recorded output by weight, which is poorly 
suited to comparisons across space or time if the output mix is different. We 
mentioned earlier that the method of aggregation for weaving, linear length, is also 
biased towards coarse cloth producers like the United States, although the evidence 
does not exist to allow us to make an accurate estimate of the extent of this bias. A re-
examination of other industries, paying careful attention to differences in product mix, 
might lead to further revisions in Anglo-American productivity comparisons. For 
example, although both writers use the Censuses as their sources, and both agree that 
the United States was the clear productivity leader, Magee finds that the US labour 
productivity lead in paper making was 92% in 1907, considerably lower than the 
162% lead found by Broadberry.
76
Broadberry, following Sandberg, ascribes the relatively good performance of the 
British cotton industry to the continuing viability of craft production in Britain in the 
face of US mass production.
77 This is not an adequate characterisation of the two 
industries, both because mules were a form of mass production, and because 
Lancashire was broadly as productive at ring spinning as New England. We argue 
instead that the most plausible proximate cause of Lancashire’s success was external 
economies of scale, and that this reflects a deeper underlying advantage: vigorous 
competition.  
Firms in Lancashire gained directly from external economies of scale, whereby costs 
fell as the size of the industry increased. External economies of scale took two forms. 
First, to quote Marshall’s dictum, ‘The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; 
but are as it were in the air.’
78 Located close together, frequent contact between mill 
  18 of 39  
owners and between workers was inevitable. Publications such as Worrall’s Directory 
gave firms good access to new inventions and modifications that could raise 
productivity. In 1902, for example, Worrall listed 62 machinery makers, 36 belt and 
strapping manufacturers, and 31 suppliers of grease and tallow. Small but useful 
innovations could be readily disseminated. Marshall also argued that specialisation 
allowed Lancashire cotton firms to concentrate on a limited range of goods.
79 In 
contrast Parker, a management consultant advising Lowell’s Boott Mills in 1902, 
arguing that they had ‘attempted to make too great a variety of yarn and cloth’,
80 
depressing productivity. Copeland noted that such specialisation was more common 
in Lancashire than in the United States.
81 In this sense, it is possible to conceptualise 
the Lancashire cotton spinning industry as the more Chandlerian. Although it was not 
vertically integrated, British firms had more spindles, and proved better able to 
produce long runs of standardised output. 
External economies of scale were not, however, exogenous to the industry, but were 
instead the result of conscious decisions as to where to locate.
82 Increasingly those 
decisions made the industry more concentrated, both in Lancashire, and within 
Lancashire.
83 For that reason we characterise external economies of scale as a 
proximate cause of Lancashire’s advantage, and argue that it was strong competitive 
pressures that forced firms to locate in areas offering high external economies of 
scale.  
Modern empirical economics is increasingly consistent in favouring the Hicksian 
critique of monopoly power. Nickell’s 1996 paper is perhaps the most sophisticated 
and convincing work in the area. He uses panel data for British industry for 1972-86 
and finds that ‘competition, measured either by increased numbers of competitors or 
by lower levels of rents, is associated with higher rates of TFP growth’.
84 The 
Hicksian notion that the ‘best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life’ implies that 
monopolist owners substitute out of costly effort and into pleasant sloth, or, more 
likely, that their managers and workers do so, unobserved by owners. Competition 
provides owners with information by which to judge their managers – namely the 
performance of rival firms. Knowing this to be so, managers work harder. The 
introduction of competitive tendering into British refuse collection industry in 1988 
provides a textbook example. Previously municipalities had collected refuse 
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themselves, as local monopolists. When competition was introduced, bids – including 
those from internal organisations – averaged 19.5% less than the previous cost, 
revealing to principals the extent of their agents’ ‘quiet life’.
85  
We can measure competitive pressure by the uniformity of an industry’s costs. If 
competition is effective, prices will be bid down, and high cost firms must cut costs or 
exit the industry. As a result, all surviving firms will have similar cost levels, so that 
the uniformity of costs acts as a measure of the degree of competition. The Tariff 
Board recorded the cost of producing twelve different yarns in each country, with a 
total of 87 observations for the United States and 79 for the United Kingdom.
86 The 
average co-efficient of variation in the costs of producing each yarn was 75% lower in 
the United Kingdom as in the United States, demonstrating greater levels of 
competitive pressure in the UK. We argue that it is this greater competitive pressure 
that forced the UK industry to pursue the cost minimising strategies of locating close 
to other firms, and rigorously adopting best production practise.  
V 
The idea that competition increases the pressure to be efficient may help to explain 
why Britain was so much more successful in the first than in the second industrial 
revolutions. Both of Britain’s two early productivity successes – textiles and 
agriculture – were characterised by low minimum efficient scale and high levels of 
competitive pressure.
87 Textile firms faced competition from other firms within 
Britain, and, through exporting, were exposed to latent competition from foreign 
firms. Good transport links ensured that agriculture also faced strong competition 
from within Britain, and as a major food importer, from abroad. Prior to the first 
world war, agricultural imports constituted 41% of total British imports, providing 
vigorous and sustained competition for British farmers.
88  
Neither textiles nor agriculture were at the forefront of the second industrial 
revolution, a revolution characterised by far greater possibilities for internal 
economies of scale. The classic example of that revolution was ‘the signature product 
of the twentieth century’, the car.
89 In 1913 the output of the British motor industry 
was fewer than 30,000 vehicles,
90 less than one-tenth the amount produced in the 
US.
91 Not only was the US market large enough for Ford to gain internal economies 
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of scale by moving to mass production, but crucially it was large enough to sustain 
other firms as well, ensuring that Ford faced continual competitive pressure. Ford out-
produced General Motors fourfold in 1913, but in that year GM still produced more 
than 50,000 cars, and was in a position to challenge Ford for industry leadership.
92 
The size of the British domestic market was too small for Britain to have a car firm 
that was simultaneously large enough to gain available economies of scale, and to 
face sustained competitive pressure from at least one another firm. Such a position 
would only have been possible had British car producers been able to follow British 
textile manufacturers in exporting a sizeable proportion of their output. But the 
countries to which Britain sold textiles, such as India, China, and Latin America were 
too poor to buy cars, and, prior to 1914, high-income countries generally had high 
tariff barriers. As a result the structure of global tariff barriers biased British industry 
towards first generation industrial products.  
Only America had a market large enough to offer second industrial revolution firms 
the possibility of internal economies of scale that would raise productivity and lower 
unit costs, and the guarantee of market discipline that would force them to make those 
investments. Furthermore, the unity of the US market was protected by the United 
States Constitution itself, which explicitly forbids the creation of tariff and non-tariff 
trade barriers between States. The result was a surging US productivity lead in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Only when trade between rich nations increased 
from 1945 were small open economies with high levels of human capital able to begin 
to close the productivity gap with the United States.
93 This suggests that it would be 
useful to consider the concept of ‘minimum efficient market size’ as a market large 
enough not only to allow one firm to reach the minimum efficient scale, but to ensure 
that that firm faces competition sufficient to give it the incentive to produce at the 
lowest cost in the short run, and to engage is activities to reduce costs in the long run. 
VI 
This paper finds that prior to the First World War Britain generally had higher levels 
of productivity in cotton spinning than did New England. This is true both on a ‘like 
for like’ basis, when comparing productivity using the same type of machinery, and 
when comparing productivity on the mix of machines that were typically used in each 
industry. This result is surprising since Britain was the labour-abundant country. It 
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indicates that, in cotton spinning at least, it is correct to characterise Britain as the 
industrial leader. Britain’s success was a function of high levels of competition, which 
forced firms to produce efficiently. This led firms to locate close together to take 
advantage of external economies of scale. By doing so they reinforced and increased 
those economies, raising potential productivity levels. In contrast New England lags 
behind Britain in productivity for all except coarse counts. We attribute this to the 
failure of New England firms to create long standardised runs of medium and fine 
counts of yarn, and to the survival of a tail of inefficient firms.  
Since Britain was the labour-abundant country, higher rates of labour productivity 
represent a challenge to the Rothbarth-Habakkuk model. We argue that challenge can 
be understood if we take the Rothbarth-Habakkuk model as showing what will happen 
under different factor conditions assuming equal levels of competitive pressure, but 
that weaker competitive pressure in the labour-scarce country may allow sufficient x-
inefficiency to eliminate and even reverse its ‘natural’ productivity lead.  
The New England industry is sometimes held up as the more developed, Chandlerian 
industrial form. The finding that New England firms had lower productivity could be 
seen as a criticism of the Chandlerian paradigm in this industry. In fact we must be 
cautious in any such conclusion, for although British firms were far less likely to be 
vertically integrated than their New England counterparts, they had on average more 
spindles than New England firms, and, as mentioned, achieved longer production runs 
of any given yarn. It possible, therefore, to argue that it is the Lancashire industry, not 
the New England one, that is the more Chandlerian. 
Our results are broadly in line with the conclusions of the contemporary Tariff Board 
Report, but contrasts with Broadberry’s findings, based on the Censuses of 
Production. We argue that this casts some doubt on the use of Production Censuses 
for productivity comparisons. They are tremendously useful in that they aggregate 
production into readily comparable categories. But we need to be sure that the 
aggregation techniques are appropriate, and do not bias the comparison in favour of 
one country or another. If that condition is satisfied then they remain a useful guide to 
comparative productivity levels, but if it does not, then they can lead to misleading 
results. 
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Ring spindles per operative, Lancashire 
 











8  182 43.243 421  261 
10  182 39.783 457  283 
12  182 37.188 489  303 
14  182 33.729 540  335 
17  182 31.134 585  363 
22  182 29.405 619  384 
29  182 28.107 648  402 
37  182 26.811 679  421 
43  182 25.945 701  435 
 
Sources. Weekly earnings, 1906 Enquiry, p. 30; Weekly wages per 100 spindles 
tended, Jewkes and Gray, Wages, p. 121. 
Notes. ‘Operative’ includes doffers. 
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Estimates of Labour Productivity using Tariff Board Report data 
 
  Wages  Unit Labour Costs Output per worker
US ring spinning firms  100  100  100 
UK mule spinning firms  76.84  69.89  109.95 
 
Sources: wages: 1905 US Census, p. 14; 1906 Earnings Enquiry, p. xviii; unit labour 
costs, Tariff Board Report, pp. 417-420. 
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TABLE 3 
Percentage of spindles and operatives, by count 
 
 Lancashire    New  England 
  Rings    Mules  Rings  Mules 
  spindles  operatives  spindles operatives  spindles operatives  spindles  operatives
<20  37 56    63 44    90 91    10  9 
21-30  47 61    53 39    89 90    11 10 
31-40  21 31    79 69    77 79    23 21 
41-60 6  10   94  90   62  64   38  36 
>60  1  1   99  99   40  42   60  58 
 
Sources. Spindles: Lancashire: 1907 UK Census and Saxonhouse and Wright ‘New 
evidence’, p. 511, data for 1878-1906; New England: 1909 US Census and appendix 
one. 
Operatives: see text, for New England we assume constant ring capital-labour ratios. 
If New England capital-labour ratios varied with the count spun, the ring operatives 
column would read 94, 93, 83, 68, 44 
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APPENDIX 1: CALCULATING CAPITAL PRODUCTIVITY RATES FOR NEW 
ENGLAND 
 
Data on output per spindle per week are taken from production records for the 
Amoskeag, Lyman and Naumkeag mills, kept in the Historical Collections of Harvard 
Business School’s Baker Library.
94 We have 43 observations for mule spinning, and 
24 observations for ring spinning. The mule data cover counts 12 to 160, while the 
ring data cover counts 13 to 90. All data are for a 58 hour week.  
 
TABLE 4a 
Output per spindle: mule spinning 
 
Count Output    Count Output  Count Output 
12 176    39 64.5  80 29.5 
17 136    40  60  80 27.5 
20 121.9    40  68  85  28.5 
23 111    40 65.8  85 26.5 
23 99.9    45 51.9  87  26 
25 98.9    45  55  90 27.3 
25  105.2    48 45  90 25 
28 84.3    50  50  100  23.3 
30  79  55  57  100  20 
31  80  55  45.5  110  15 
33  80  60  40.6  125  10 
34  75  65  36.3  130  15.7 
35 69.1    70  33  160 10 
38  55  75  30.7     
38 70.4    75  27     
 
TABLE 4b 
Output per spindle: ring spinning 
 
Count Output    Count Output  Count Output 
13 320.4    25 185.2  35 104.4 
16  257    26 153.6  35 116.2 
16 323.8    28 116.7  36  86.7 
18 181.7    28 127.2  40  79.9 
19 238    29  116.6  50  67 
22 200.9    30  98.2  60  45 
23 171.7    32 105.9  70  32 
24 130.3    34  90.5  90  24 
 
We regress output on count to generate capital productivity series for mules and for 
rings that are both smooth and complete. Graphs of the actual and estimates lines are 
given below. 
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TABLE 5 
Estimates of New England mule and ring output per spindle 
 













2 0.99 0.93 
SE 4.0  22.3 
F 1704  286 
 
OLS regression performed using Stata; t-statistics in parentheses. The 1/count
2 term 
was not significant in the ring spindle regression and has been omitted.  
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Figure 4 
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TABLE 6 
Reconciling New England estimated capital productivity figures  
with aggregate spindle numbers and aggregate output  
 




Sub 20  290,135  1,955 
21-40 461,031 8,174 
41+ 114,721  5,428 
Total 865,888  15,557 
Actual spindles    15,384 
Productivity underestimate    1.1% 
 
Notes: 
We assume that spindles are distributed uniformly within bands. We define sub-20 as 
8-20 and supra-40 as 40-80.  
 
Sources: 
Output and actual spindleage, 1909 US Census, pp. 54-55. 
Ring and mule output per 100 spindles per week, from figure 1 
For this calculation we assume New England mills worked a 49.9 week year, in line 
with the UK, 1906 Enquiry p. xix. 
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APPENDIX 2 USING UNIT LABOUR COSTS AS A CHECK ON 
PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Unit labour costs can be used to check our relative productivity numbers within each 
country. High tariff barriers mean that comparing unit labour costs across the two 
countries cannot tell us anything about relative level of productivity in each. Within 
both countries we expect ring unit labour costs to be lower than mules unit labour 
costs, with a wider margin in New England. We can also compare the unit labour cost 
saving from adopting rings with the additional expense of buying longer staple raw 
cotton needed for ring spinning. Since both rings and mules were used extensively for 
counts below 40 in Lancashire, we expect labour savings on rings to broadly equal the 
additional raw cotton cost for these counts, with mules the more cost efficient option 
thereafter. In New England, by contrast, we expect labour savings to dominate the 
additional raw cotton expense for all except high counts. Tables seven, eight and nine 
show that all of these predictions are born out, suggesting that our assessment of the 
relative productivity of ring and mule spinners in each country is accurate.  
 
TABLE 7 
Lancashire unit costs (d/lb) 
 












16 0.2  0.16  0.04  0  0.04 
32  0.42 0.30 0.12 0.12  0 
40  0.56 0.39 0.17 0.25 -0.08 
60  1.01 0.69 0.32 0.50 -0.18 
 
Sources: Wages: 1906 Enquiry, pp. 29-31; productivity: figure two; raw cotton 
premiums: Winterbottom Calculations, pp. 235-236. 
 
TABLE 8 
New England unit costs, constant spindles (c/lb) 
 












16 1.07  0.44  0.63  0  0.63 
32 1.97  1.04  0.93  0.25  0.68 
40 2.47  1.43  1.04  0.50  0.54 
60 3.84  2.84  1.00  1.00  0 
 
Sources: Wages: Chas Pidgen ‘Wages in Massachusetts Mills’, HBL Tremont and 
Suffolk Collection, Misc papers, clippings; productivity: figure two; raw cotton 
premiums: Winterbottom Calculations, pp. 235-236. 
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TABLE 9 
New England unit costs, count varying spindles (c/lb) 
 












16 1.07  0.53  0.55  0  0.55 
32 1.97  1.03  0.94  0.25  0.69 
40 2.47  1.35  1.12  0.50  0.62 
60 3.84  2.60  1.24  1.00  0.24 
 
Sources: Wages: Chas Pidgen ‘Wages in Massachusetts Mills’, HBL Tremont and 
Suffolk Collection, Misc papers, clippings; productivity: figure two; raw cotton 
premiums: Winterbottom Calculations, pp. 235-236. 
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